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Abstract:  We develop a "passive learning" model of firm entry by spin-off: firm 
employees leave their employer and create a new firm when (a) they learn they are good 
entrepreneurs (type I spin-offs) or (b) they learn their employer's prospects are bad (type 
II spin-offs). Our theory predicts a high correlation between spin-offs and parent exit, 
especially when the parent is a low-productivity firm.  This correlation may correspond to 
two types of causality: spin-off causes firm exit (type I spin-offs) and firm exit causes 
spin-off (type II spin-offs).  We test and confirm this and other model predictions on a 
unique data set of the U.S. automobile industry.  Finally, we discuss policy implications 
regarding "covenant not to compete" laws. 
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assistance. 1 Introduction
In many industries, a considerable fraction of ¯rm entry results from spin-o®s,
which we de¯ne as the situation when a ¯rm's employee leaves his employer
and starts a new ¯rm in the same industry. For example, in the automobile
industry and in the period 1895{1969, 18% of all new ¯rms were spin-o®s
of existing ¯rms. This pattern suggests at least two questions: First, why
do spin-o®s take place? and second, do spin-o®s lead to a socially e±cient
allocation of resources?
Recent research provides a series of answers to the ¯rst question. Klep-
per and Slepper (2002) and Klepper and Thompson (2005, 2006) propose a
\disagreement" theory of spin-o®s. If an employee's idea is not adopted by
his employer, then the employee is likely to leave and create a ¯rm where his
idea can be implemented. Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2007) propose an
adverse selection theory of spin-o®s. To the extent that employees have bet-
ter information about the value of their ideas, an adverse selection problem
arises, the equilibrium of which is for owners of better ideas to start a new
¯rm. Baccara and Razin (2006) present a theory whereby employees choose
to spin-o® either because they fear the employer may expropriate the rents
°owing from innovation or because the employer discourages innovation in
favor of maintaining the existing intra-¯rm rent distribution. Finally, Franco
and Filson (2006) stress the fact that employees acquire know-how while
working for a ¯rm and eventually capitalize on that know-how by starting
their own ¯rm.
Regarding the welfare impact of spin-o®s, there are two important consid-
erations. To the extent that exiting employees take ideas or other resources
from their former employer, spin-o®s may imply an equilibrium with under-
investment, as ¯rms are reluctant to invest in ideas that will be stolen by
their employees. By contrast, to the extent that employees increase their hu-
man capital while employed and then apply it to the creation of new value,
spin-o®s correspond to an e±cient reallocation of resources. The relative
magnitude of these two e®ects is an important policy question. Some states
enforce \covenant not to compete" (CNC) laws based on the belief that the
1¯rst e®ect dominates.1 However, authors such as Franco and Mitchell (2008)
argue that CNC laws in Massachusetts may have caused Route 128 to be
taken over by the Silicon Valley, suggesting that the value creation e®ect of
spin-o®s may be important.
In this paper, we present a novel theory of spin-o®s. Our model implicitly
or explicitly incorporates many of the features of previous theories of spin-
o®s. However, we extend the analysis in two important dimensions. First,
in the tradition of Jovanovic's (1982) \passive learning" theory of industry
evolution, we assume that ¯rms learn their type over time; and to this we
add the hypothesis that employees also learn their ability over time. In this
context, spin-o®s take place either because an employee learns that he would
make a good entrepreneur (type I spin-o®) or because he learns his employer's
prospects are poor, and so the opportunity cost of leaving the ¯rm is small
(type II spin-o®).
The second important contribution of our work is that, unlike the previ-
ous literature, we pay close attention to the interdependence between parent
performance and spin-o® performance as implied by our model. First, we
show that spin-o® entrants are more likely to survive than de novo entrants
(because the group of spin-o® entrants is biased toward higher types). Sec-
ond, we show that spin-o®s have a negative impact on the survival of low-type
parents (because a spin-o® implies that the parent loses talent which is better
than market average). Third, we show that spin-o®s originating from sur-
viving parents perform better than spin-o®s originating from dying parents
(because the former are all high-type entrepreneurs but the latter include
a mixture of high-type and low-type entrepreneurs). In sum, we show that
sometimes spin-o®s cause parent failure (type I spin-o®), whereas in other
cases parent failure causes spin-o®s (type II spin-o®).
We test these predictions on a dataset of the US automobile industry,
focusing on the industry's early years (1895{1942). Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that both type I and type II spin-o®s take place in this industry. An
example of a type I spin-o® is given by Lozier and Chandler. Lozier Mo-
tor Company started production in 1904. Its output peaked in the 1912
1. A covenant not to compete, also called a non-competitive clause, is a formal agree-
ment requiring former employees not to perform similar work within a designated
area for a speci¯ed amount of time after leaving their original employer.
2model year at 600 cars. Frederick C. Chandler, Lozier's top designer, left
the company in 1913 (together with several top company executives) and
formed the Chandler Motor Company. The impact of Chandler's departure
was deeply felt at the parent company. Lozier never recovered from the brain
drain and stopped production in 1914. After a failed attempt to merge with
Ford Motor Company, it declared bankruptcy. Chandler Motor Company,
by contrast, became a successful producer, peaking at 20,000 cars in 1927.
In 1929, Chandler Motor Company was purchased by Hupp Motor Works.
An example of a type II spin-o® is given by Emerson and Campbell. The
Emerson Motor Company started production in 1917 with the goal of chal-
lenging the highly successful Ford Model T. In the process of allegedly raising
capital for Emerson, several stock promoters obtained (and pocketed) more
than $1,500,000 under the promise that the company had a production ca-
pacity of 80,000 cars a year (which it didn't). Court proceeding were initiated
against Emerson M C and four individuals, all of whom were found guilty of
mail fraud. In September 1917, co-founders and brothers Campbell left the
company and founded the Campbell Motor Company, which produced the
the same car as Emerson. By May 1919, Campbell was on receivership.
Although anecdotal evidence gives credence to our theory, we seek further
con¯rmation by means of econometric analysis. We show that our predictions
are economically and statistically signi¯cant. Finally, we discuss policy
implications, especially with regard to \covenant not to compete" (CNC)
laws.
2 Model
Consider a competitive, homogeneous product industry with demand D(p)
and inverse demand P(Y ), where p is price and Y industry output. We
assume that lim
Y !0
P(Y ) = 1 and lim
p!0
D(p) = 1.
Market supply consists of a measure of atomless ¯rms. Each ¯rm is made
up of two agents: a manager (also referred to as the \entrepreneur"), and an
employee (also referred to as the \worker").2 Each agent can be of two types:
2. While we use the terminology \worker," what we have in mind is a high-level,
high-skill employee such as a leading designer, or engineer.
3Table 1: Timing: stages within each period.
s = 1 Firm exit decisions (voluntary and involuntary).
s = 2 Worker mobility (spin-o®s and new hirings).
s = 3 Firm entry decisions (insiders and outsiders).
s = 4 Payo®s received (pro¯ts and wages).
H (probability ® at birth) and L (probability 1 ¡ ®), where H > L. Before
entering the industry, an agent does not know its type, only the prior ®.
Upon entering the industry (either as a manager or as a worker), an agent's
type becomes common knowledge within the ¯rm.
An active type z ¯rm earns a pro¯t
¼z = pyz ¡ !
where yz is output level, ! the wage rate paid to the sole worker, and z =
HH;HL;LH;LL represents the four possible types a ¯rm can be: the ¯rst
subscript denotes the manager's type and the second subscript denotes the
worker's type. We assume that ¯rm output is strictly increasing in manager
type and in worker type; that is, yz = f(m;w), where m is manager type and
w is worker type (m;w = H;L), and f(¢) is increasing in both arguments.




Time is discrete and continues on forever. Within each period, we consider
four main stages (see Table 1). First, both nature and ¯rm managers make
exit decisions. Nature decides with probability 1 ¡ ° that the ¯rm will exit
by the end of the period. Even if the ¯rm survives the Nature shock, the
¯rm manager decides whether to exit or remain active.
In the second stage, workers in active ¯rms must decide whether to con-
tinue as employees or rather leave the ¯rm (to attempt a spin-o®). If a
worker leaves the ¯rm, then the worker is replaced by a generic worker from
the pool of potential entrants as workers. In particular, the new hire is of
type H with probability ®.
Decisions to create new ¯rms take place during the third stage. By then
there are three groups of potential entrepreneurs: former ¯rm managers who
4decided to close down their ¯rm, or were subject to a Nature shock; former
workers who decided to leave the ¯rm or became unemployed by virtue of
their employer's exit; and potential ¯rst-time entrants. We call the ¯rst two
groups the insiders, in the sense that they already have industry experience;
and we call the third group the outsiders. This is an important distinction
because the entry cost is di®erent for insiders (Á) and for ¯rst-time entrants
(Ã + Á > Á). The idea is that part of the entry cost for a ¯rst-time entrant
corresponds to an industry learning cost. Notice also that among the insiders
we can also make a distinction between H types and L types.
By deciding to create a new ¯rm, a would-be manager pays the entry
cost (Á or Ã + Á) and is successful with probability ½. Alternatively, agents
may collect » as an outside option. For simplicity, we also assume that
unsuccessful entrepreneurs (1¡½ of those who try) stay with their employer
(if there were employed) or otherwise leave the industry and collect their
outside option payo® ».
Finally, during the fourth stage production payo®s are received: ¼z to the
manager and ! to the worker.
There are a few implicit assumptions in this set-up which we should stress.
First, we assume that wages are independent of the agent's type (or the
manager's). In a more realistic model we might include some model of wage
negotiation or wage market setting. However, to the extent that contracts
are incomplete and/or the agent's type is unobservable or unveri¯able, our
assumption is not a bad approximation. It will also allows us to focus on the
issues that the paper deals with primarily.
Second, we assume that manager and worker cannot trade places, nor
can the manager ¯re the worker. Again, we think of this as a reduced-form
of a more complex model where, due to information asymmetries, govern-
ment regulation, or some other source of ine±ciency, the only option open
to managers is to close down the ¯rm and the only option open to workers
is to leave the ¯rm.
Figure 1 helps understand the main °ows of ¯rms and agents in our
model. In this ¯gure, square \bins" represent ¯rm types, whereas circular
\bins" represent agent types (with E denoting an entrant who still does not
know his type).
The arrows in Figure 1 represent °ows from one period to the next. They
5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .





. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..
. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1: Firm and agent °ows.
6can be of two types: solid arrows represent ¯rm °ows, whereas dashed arrows
represent agent °ows. For example, the circular arrow in box HH indicates
that a fraction of the HH type ¯rms in period t remain HH type ¯rms in
period t + 1. The dashed arrow going out of the HH box indicates that, if
a HH type ¯rm decides to exit, then there is a °ow into the bin of H type
agents. These agents may either exit the industry altogether, as denoted
by the dashed line to the left of the H bin, or they may create a new ¯rm.
Depending on whether they hire a worker of type H or type L, this will
create a ¯rm °ow into the HH or HL bin, respectively.
3 Equilibrium
The model presented in the previous section, together with a set of deci-
sion rules by managers and workers, leads to a dynamic path of ¹t
z (z =
HH;HL;LH;LL), the measure of ¯rms of type z in period t. We look for a
situation where the values of ¹z are stable (time invariant). Speci¯cally, a
stationary equilibrium is de¯ned by a set of measures of active ¯rms ¹z; a
measure of new entrants º; and an industry price p that satisfy a series of
transition and optimality conditions:
1. Managers make optimal exit decisions given ¯rm type z;
2. Workers make optimal spin-o® decisions;
3. Potential entrants make optimal entry decision;
4. The °ows of managers and ¯rms are balanced;
5. The market clears: p = P(Y ), where Y =
P
¹z yz.
Our main result pertains to the existence and properties of such an equilib-
rium.
Proposition 1 (stationary equilibrium) For an open set of parameter
values, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with the following prop-
erties:
(a) Firms choose to voluntarily exit if and only if their type is z = LL;
7(b) Workers attempt a spin-o® if and only if their type is H or their
type is L and they know the ¯rm will exit.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Note that part (b) of Proposition
1 refers to two di®erent types of spin-o®. A worker who learns he is of type
H is strictly better o® by spinning-o®, regardless of the parent ¯rm's type;
we call this a type I spin-o®. Moreover, a worker who learns that the ¯rm
will exit by the end of the period is also strictly better o® by spinning-o®,
regardless of his type; we call this a type II spin-o®.
4 Testable implications
We now explore some implications of our model for the relation between spin-
o®s and ¯rm performance. Given data availability, we consider an indirect
measure of ¯rm performance: survival rates. We are interested in the impact
of spin-o®s on the parent's and the new ¯rm's survival rate.3
The next result provides three testable implications of our theory regard-
ing spin-o® performance. For the purpose of our paper, we de¯ne a surviving
parent as one that continues in operation beyond the period when the spin-o®
takes place.
Proposition 2 (spin-o® performance)
(a) Spin-o®s originating from surviving parents survive with higher
probability than de novo entrants.
(b) Spin-o®s originating from surviving parents survive with higher
probability than spin-o®s originating from non-surviving parents.
(c) The survival rates of a spin-o® originating from a surviving parent
is independent of parent type.
3. Our model allows for the possibility of spin-o®s initiated by ¯rm owners. However,
our analysis focuses on spin-o®s initiated by former employees. The next two
propositions refer to the latter type of spin-o®s.
8Proof: A de novo entrant's manager is of type H with probability ®; the
manager of a spin-o® ¯rm originating from a surviving parent is of type H
with probability one (regardless of parent type); and the manager of a spin-
o® ¯rm originating from a non-surviving parent is of type H if probability
strictly lower than one. The various results follow.
The following result provides three testable implications of our theory
regarding parent performance.
Proposition 3 (parent performance)
(a) If a ¯rm is of type HH, then its survival rate is invariant with
respect to the occurrence of a spin-o®.
(b) If a ¯rm is not of type HH, then its survival rate is lower
conditional on giving birth to a spin-o®.
(c) A ¯rm's survival rate conditional on giving birth to an L manager
spin-o® is lower than its survival rate conditional on giving birth
to an H manager spin-o®.
Proof: (a) An HH type ¯rm only exits due to an exogenous shock, the
probability of which is orthogonal to the event of a spin-o®. (b) A ¯rm of
type LH who loses its worker switches from z = LH to z = LL with prob-
ability ½(1 ¡ ®), in which case it exits. Otherwise, it remains at z = LH,
in which case it does not voluntarily exit. A ¯rm of type HL only gives rise
to a spin-o® if it is about to exit due to an exogenous shock. (c) Finally,
the only instance when a spin-o® is initiated by an L type worker is when
its parent's exit is anticipated, in which case exit takes place with proba-
bility one. By contrast, a parent who gives birth to a spin-o® initiated by
an H type worker experiences a death rate which is strictly lower than one.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 suggests that a high-type ¯rm (HH in our
model) is less sensitive to a spin-o® than other ¯rms (in terms of survival
rate). In our model, this results from the high level of managerial human
capital in a high-type ¯rm. In reality, however, ¯rm size may also play a role.
95 Data and empirical results
We test the implications of our model using a unique dataset of the U.S.
automobile industry. The dataset covers U.S. companies that sold at least
one automobile to the public during the industry's ¯rst 75 years (1895{1969),
a total of 780 ¯rms.
The data sources come from di®erent industry references. First, Smith
(1968) provides a list of every make of automobile produced commercially in
the U.S. from the industry's beginnings in 1895 through 1969.4 The book
lists the ¯rm that manufactured each car make, the ¯rm's location, the years
the particular make was produced, and any reorganizations and ownership
changes the ¯rm underwent. Smith's list of car makes was then used to
derive the entry and exit of each individual ¯rm, where entry and exit dates
are based on the ¯rst and last year of commercial production. As shown in
Figure 2, the automobile industry went through a tremendous development
during this period, evolving from a small infant industry into a gigantic,
concentrated, mature industry. The number of automobile manufacturers
peaked at 206 in 1908. From then and until the late 1920s there was a
considerable industry shakeout, with the total number of ¯rms dropping to
24 in 1929. Further consolidation took place, and by 1940 there were only
8 active ¯rms. Despite the overall boom-and-bust cycle, we note that, as
happens in many other industries (e.g., Dunne et al, 1988) the net entry/exit
rate is much lower than the turnover rate, that is, we observe simultaneous
entry and exit in the industry pretty much at all stages.
Second, Kimes (1996) provides comprehensive historical information for
every automobile make produced in the U.S. from 1890{1942. Using Kimes
(1996), we are able to collect additional biographical information about the
entrepreneurs who founded and ran each individual ¯rm. An entrepreneur
was then categorized into several groups. One group includes those en-
trepreneurs who had prior experience in engineering, mechanics or other
technologically related industries. Another group includes experienced en-
trepreneurs who founded or ran ¯rms before entering the automobile indus-
try. Still another group includes spin-o® entrepreneurs, that is, entrepreneurs
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Figure 2: Evolution of the U.S. automobile industry, 1895{1969.
who worked as employees in existing automobile ¯rms before starting their
own ¯rm. The last group consists of de novo entrepreneurs, namely those
with no identi¯able background. Note that these groups are not mutually
exclusive: for example, someone might have run a non-automobile ¯rm and
also worked as an employee in an automobile ¯rm before starting his own
automobile company. In that case, he is categorized as both an experienced
entrepreneur and a spin-o®. Figure 3 splits the number of entries into spin-
o®s and other entries. (We restrict to the period 1895{1925, when the number
of entrants was signi¯cant.) As can be seen, after the ¯rst industry shakeout
(circa 1910), the number of spin-o® entrants and other entrants is of the same
order of magnitude.
Third, Bailey (1971) provides a list of leading automobile makes from
1896{1970 based on top-15 annual sales. Using this information, together
with the other two sources, we are able to identify top automobile producers
during the relevant periods.
In summary, we put together a dataset including the following informa-
tion:
1. The entry year of each ¯rm;
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Figure 3: Evolution of the U.S. automobile industry, 1895{1925.
3. The type of each ¯rm exit, that is, whether the ¯rm exited by liquida-
tion or by merger or acquisition;
4. The background of each entrepreneur mapped into four categories, in-
cluding spin-o®s, de novo entrants, entrepreneurs with technological
background and experienced entrepreneurs;
5. The quality of each ¯rm in terms of producing top makes in the industry
or not;
6. The ¯rm's location.
Using the above information, we created the following dummy variables
(indexed by ¯rm and year). Whenever the de¯nition of the variable is not
obvious, an explanation is given.
² Firm died in current period. In our base regressions, we exclude the
cases when a top ¯rm merged or was acquired.5 There were 15 such
observations, about 2% of the total number of exits.
5. In our robustness section, we explain our choice and show it has little impact on
our results.
12² Firm is Top. The ¯rm was classi¯ed as the producer of a top car make
during at least one year in the sample.6 (In terms of our theoretical
model, we think of a Top ¯rm as an HH type.)
² Firm is Bottom. The ¯rm is not a Top ¯rm.
² Firm was created as a spin-o®. The ¯rm's founder worked for another
auto manufacturer prior to founding the ¯rm.
² Firm was spun-o® from Top parent.
² Firm was spun-o® from Bottom parent.
² Firm was spun-o® from Bottom surviving parent. A surviving parent
is de¯ned as one that was active for at least 2 years after the spin-o®
took place.
² Firm was spun-o® from Bottom non-surviving parent.
² Firm is Top and gave birth to spin-o®.
² Firm is Bottom and gave birth to spin-o®.
² Firm is Bottom and gave birth to Good spin-o®. A Good spin-o® is
de¯ned as one that survives for more than 1 year.
² Firm is Bottom and gave birth to Bad spin-o®. A Bad spin-o® is de¯ned
as one that survives for only 1 year or less.
² Founder's background is technology related.
² Founder's background is entrepreneurial related.
In addition, we created the following variables:
² Firm age.
² Year.
6. In our robustness section, we use di®erent de¯nitions of this variable and obtain
similar results.
13² Region. We created seven regional dummies corresponding to: Great
Lakes, Mid Atlantic, Michigan, Mid West, New England, South, and
West.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (¯rm level data).
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Firm was created as a spin-o® 0.177 0.382 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Top par-
ent
0.071 0.257 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
parent
0.106 0.308 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
surviving parent
0.080 0.271 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
non-surviving parent
0.026 0.159 0 1
Firm is Top 0.061 0.239 0 1
Founder's background is tech-
nology related
0.466 0.499 0 1
Founder's background is en-
trepreneurial related
0.375 0.484 0 1
Entry year 1908 6.3 1895 1939
Number of observations: 776
Descriptive statistics. Tables 2 and 3 provide some descriptive statis-
tics of the main variables we created, both at the ¯rm level and at the ¯rm
£ year level. From Table 2 (¯rm level data), we can see that about 17.7%
of all ¯rm entries took place as spin-o®s from existing ¯rms (7.1% from Top
parents, 8.0% from Bottom surviving parents, and 2.6% from Bottom non-
surviving parents). About 6.1% of ¯rms are Top. Almost one half of ¯rm
founders had a technology related background; more than a third had previ-
ous entrepreneurial experience.
From Table 3, we can see that the ¯rm death rate is about 17.2% per
year. This is somewhat higher than a typical exit rate in mature industries
14(e.g., Dunne et al, 1988), which is only normal given that we are analyzing
a growing industry, where the level of turnover is typically higher. We also
see that the average age of a ¯rm is just under 7 years.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (¯rm£year level data).
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Firm died in current period 0.172 0.378 0 1
Firm was created as a spin-o® 0.199 0.400 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Top par-
ent
0.106 0.308 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
parent
0.093 0.291 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
surviving parent
0.072 0.259 0 1
Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
non-surviving parent
0.021 0.144 0 1
Firm is Top 0.197 0.398 0 1
Firm is Top and gave birth to
spin-o®
0.010 0.099 0 1
Firm is Bottom and gave birth
to spin-o®
0.010 0.098 0 1
Firm is Bottom and gave birth
to Good spin-o®
0.007 0.084 0 1
Firm is Bottom and gave birth
to Bad spin-o®
0.002 0.050 0 1
Founder's background is tech-
nology related
0.532 0.499 0 1
Founder's background is en-
trepreneurial related
0.452 0.498 0 1
Firm age 6.821 7.168 1 43
Year 1913 8.4 1895 1942
Number of observations: 4457
15Regressions. We ran a series of logit regressions using ¯rm-year ob-
servations with Firm died in current period as the dependent variable. The
basic logit model is equivalent to a discrete-time duration model under the
assumption that the baseline hazard is constant over time. However, by in-
cluding ¯rm age and year e®ects, we allow the hazard rate to vary over time.
The inclusion of year e®ects also addresses the potential problem that the
automobile industry underwent a major shakeout during the period we run
our regressions.
The data range is from 1895{1942, including 776 ¯rms and 4457 ¯rm-year
observations.7 In each regression, we divide the set of explanatory variables
into two sets. The ¯rst set corresponds to the variables that have a direct
bearing on the testable implication included in Propositions 2 and 3. The
second set corresponds to additional variables that we would expect to have
an in°uence of ¯rm survival. We could have developed a more complex theo-
retical model to account for those e®ects but chose rather to stick to the main
focus in the paper: the relation between parent and spin-o® performance.
Table 4 presents results from our ¯rst regression. In this regression, we
consider three variables that address the implications of Propositions 2 and 3.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 suggests that the coe±cient of the variable Firm was
created as a spin-o® should be negative.8 The second and third explanatory
variables directly test parts (a) and (b) Proposition 3. Speci¯cally, we expect
the coe±cient of Firm is Top and gave birth to spin-o® to be zero and the
coe±cient of Firm is Bottom and gave birth to spin-o® to be positive: when a
Bottom ¯rm gives birth to a spin-o®, either the spin-o® is a type II spin-o®, in
which case the parent exits (bail-out e®ect); or the parent loses valuable talent
in a type I spin-o®, which in turn increases the exit probability (depletion
e®ect).
7. Given the information provided in Kimes (1996), we collect biographical informa-
tion about the entrepreneurs up to 1942, before the U.S. entered WWII.
8. Strictly speaking, part (a) of Proposition 2 states that spin-o®s of surviving par-
ents perform better than de novo entrants. Spin-o®s originating from non-surviving
¯rms are started by both type H and type L entrepreneurs, and so, theoretically,
their survival rate could be greater or lower than a de novo entrant. However, as
we have seen, the summary statistics show that most spin-o®s originate in surviv-
ing parents. We conclude that Proposition 2 can also be read unconditionally on
parent's survival. In our next regression, we further test and con¯rm this interpre-
tation.
16Table 4: Spin-o® and parent performance.
Dependent variable: Firm died in current period
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. z P > jzj
Firm was created as a spin-o® ¡0:243 0:129 ¡1:88 0:060
Firm is Top and gave birth to
spin-o®
¡0:088 1:035 ¡0:08 0:932
Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to spin-o®
0:866 0:321 2:70 0:007
Firm is Top ¡2:092 0:229 ¡9:15 0:000
Founder's background is
technology related
¡0:313 0:097 ¡3:23 0:001
Founder's background is
entrepreneurial related
¡0:275 0:090 ¡3:07 0:002
Firm age ¡0:015 0:010 ¡1:56 0:119
Year 0:021 0:007 2:99 0:003
Constant ¡41:211 13:424 ¡3:07 0:002
Number of observations: 4443
The results are consistent with these predictions. The coe±cient of Firm
was created as a spin-o® is negative and signi¯cant at the 6.0% level. The
coe±cient of Firm is Top and gave birth to spin-o® is not signi¯cantly dif-
ferent from zero. Finally, the coe±cient of Firm is Bottom and gave birth to
spin-o® is positive and signi¯cant at the 0.7% percent level.
In order to get a feel for the economic magnitude of these coe±cients,
we also computed their associated odds ratios. The odds ratio for Firm was
created as a spin-o® is given by .7845. This implies that the ratio d=(1¡d),
where d is the death rate, is (1¡0:7845) lower for spino® ¯rms. Speci¯cally,
given that the sample average death rate of non-spino® ¯rms is 17.77%,
our model predicts that the average death rate of a spin-o® ¯rm is 14.50%
(in other words, the death rate drops by 18%). The odds ratio of Firm is
Bottom and gave birth to spin-o® is given by 2.3774. This implies that the
ratio d=(1 ¡ d) is (2:3774 ¡ 1) higher for Bottom ¯rms who give birth to
17spino® ¯rms than for other Bottom ¯rms. Speci¯cally, given that the sample
average death rate of Bottom ¯rms who do not give birth is 20.16%, our
model predicts that the average death rate of Bottom ¯rms who give birth
to a spin-o® is 37.51% (in other words, the death rate increases by 86%).
The remaining explanatory variables have the signs we would expect.
Many models of ¯rm entry and exit predict that larger and/or more pro¯table
¯rms survive with higher probability, leading to a negative coe±cient for Firm
is Top, as the results indeed suggest.9 Any model with experience e®ects
would predict a positive coe±cient for the variables Founder's background
is technology related and Founder's background is entrepreneurial related.
Again, the results con¯rm the expectation.
Table 5 reports on the results of a second regression. We now \split" the
variable Firm was created as a spin-o® into three variables: Firm was spun-o®
from Top parent, Firm was spun-o® from Bottom surviving parent, and Firm
was spun-o® from Bottom non-surviving parent. Part (b) of Proposition 2
implies that the coe±cient of Firm was spun-o® from Bottom non-surviving
parent be greater than the coe±cient of Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
surviving parent. Part (c) of Proposition 2 implies that the coe±cient of
Firm was spun-o® from Top parent and Firm was spun-o® from Bottom
surviving parent be the same.
The results are again consistent with the theory. Both the coe±cients
of Firm was spun-o® from Top parent and Firm was spun-o® from Bot-
tom surviving parent are negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (if
marginally). Since the coe±cients are not statistically di®erent from each
other and are of similar magnitude, we ran a separate regression imposing the
same coe±cient on both variables, as our theory suggests. The coe±cient's
estimate is now ¡:276 and statistical signi¯cance level increases considerably,
with a p value of 0.042.
The coe±cient of Firm was spun-o® from Bottom non-surviving parent
is close to zero and in fact is not statistically di®erent from zero. Since the
omitted case is de novo entry, the results suggest that a spin-o® from a dying
parent is not di®erent, in terms of post-entry performance, than a de novo
9. For simplicity, in our theoretical model we assumed the value of ° (the probability
of a Nature exit shock) is the same for all ¯rm types. We could easily have chosen
type-speci¯c values of ° to obtain di®erent exit probabilities.
18entrant. Finally, the above values also imply that the coe±cient of Firm was
spun-o® from Bottom surviving parent is lower than the coe±cient of Firm
was spun-o® from Bottom non-surviving parent, as predicted by theory.
Table 5: Spin-o® and parent performance.
Dependent variable: Firm died in current period
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. z P > jzj
Firm was spun-o® from Top
parent
¡0:295 0:189 ¡1:56 0:119
Firm was spun-o® from
Bottom surviving parent
¡0:263 0:164 ¡1:61 0:108
Firm was spun-o® from
Bottom non-surviving parent
¡0:047 0:269 ¡0:18 0:860
Firm is Top and gave birth to
spin-o®
¡0:081 1:035 ¡0:08 0:937
Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to spin-o®
0:874 0:321 2:72 0:006
Firm is Top ¡2:079 0:233 ¡8:91 0:000
Founder's background is
technology related
¡0:315 0:097 ¡3:25 0:001
Founder's background is
entrepreneurial related
¡0:272 0:090 ¡3:03 0:002
Firm age ¡0:015 0:010 ¡1:56 0:119
Year 0:021 0:007 2:97 0:003
Constant ¡41:329 13:542 ¡3:05 0:002
Number of observations: 4443
Table 6 reports on the results of a third regression. This time we \split"
the variable Firm is Bottom and gave birth to spin-o® into two: Firm is
Bottom and gave birth to Good spin-o® and Firm is Bottom and gave birth to
Bad spin-o®. Being a Bad spin-o® is positively correlated with the founder's
being a low type worker. According to our theory, the only case when a low
type worker starts a spin-o® is when he expects the parent to exit (type II
19spin-o®). Consequently, we expect the coe±cient on Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to Bad spin-o® to be greater than the coe±cient on Firm is Bottom
and gave birth to Good spin-o®.
Table 6: Spin-o® and parent performance.
Dependent variable: Firm died in current period
Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. z P > jzj
Firm was created as a spin-o® ¡0:246 0:129 ¡1:90 0:057
Firm is Top and gave birth to
spin-o®
¡0:087 1:035 ¡0:08 0:933
Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to Good spin-o®
0:469 0:398 1:18 0:238
Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to Bad spin-o®
1:897 0:633 3:00 0:003
Firm is Top ¡2:093 0:229 ¡9:16 0:000
Founder's background is
technology related
¡0:309 0:097 ¡3:19 0:001
Founder's background is
entrepreneurial related
¡0:278 0:090 ¡3:09 0:002
Firm age ¡0:015 0:010 ¡1:53 0:126
Year 0:021 0:007 2:97 0:003
Constant ¡41:003 13:436 ¡3:05 0:002
Number of observations: 4443
As mentioned earlier, we de¯ne a Good spin-o® as one that survives for
more than one year. We tried di®erent thresholds and decided that one year
was best. Ideally, the split should be such that a Good spin-o® from a Bottom
¯rm performs as well as a spin-o® from a Top ¯rm. The average life span of
a spin-o® from a Top ¯rm is 6.96 years, whereas the average life span of a
spin-o® from a Bottom ¯rm is 4.90 years (lower, as expected). Among the
latter, if we exclude spin-o®s who survived for one year or less, the average
life span increases to 6.56 years. If we also exclude spin-o®s who survived for
two years, then the average life span increases to 7.57 years.
20The results reported in Table 6 con¯rm our prediction. The coe±cient
on Firm is Bottom and gave birth to Bad spin-o® is positive, large, and
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The coe±cient on Firm is Bottom and gave
birth to Good spin-o®, by contrast, is not statistically di®erent from zero.
Nevertheless, the coe±cient is positive, as predicted by the depletion e®ect of
type I spin-o®s. Moreover, consistently with parts (a) and (b) of Proposition
3, the coe±cient on Firm is Bottom and gave birth to Good spin-o® is higher
than the coe±cient on Firm is Top and gave birth to spin-o®.
Robustness checks. While our base results correspond to a limited
number of regression equations, we ¯nd them to be fairly robust. We per-
formed a series of robustness checks. First, in our base de¯nition of exit, we
exclude high-type ¯rm exits by merger or acquisition. The idea is that merg-
ing with or being acquired by another ¯rm may re°ect good performance
rather than poor performance. We repeated the same regressions with the
alternative de¯nition that includes all exits. The results are very similar to
our base results.
Second, in our base regressions we estimate the impact of spin-o®s on
parent performance by considering contemporaneous e®ects only. Alterna-
tively, we may also consider one-year lagged e®ects. The results are again
very similar.
Third, we re-estimated the results on a sub-sample consisting of years
1910{1942. Figure 3 suggests that this was a period where de novo and spin-
o® entry patterns were more stable. We obtain similar results to those on
the 1895{1942, although, as expected, the levels of statistical signi¯cance are
lower.
Fourth, we consider various de¯nitions of Top ¯rms. In our base regres-
sions, we count a ¯rm as a Top ¯rm if it ever made the top annual sale list
in Bailey (1971). Alternatively, a ¯rm may be counted as Top during a time
window N years before and after it made it to the top sales list (or until a
spin-o® occurred). We experimented di®erent values of N and the results
were quite similar.
Fifth, we considered a variety of additional possible controls, including
year and regional dummies. The results are very similar. Finally, we also
considered the possibility of ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. Our random-e®ect logit panel
21regressions yield very similar results to our basic regressions.10
6 Concluding remarks
Our model of passive learning about ¯rm type and worker type, while rel-
atively simple, leads to a rich set of implications regarding spin-o® perfor-
mance, parent performance, and the relation between spin-o® and parent
performance. In particular, our theory predicts a high correlation between
spin-o®s and parent exit, especially when the parent is a low-productivity
¯rm. This correlation may correspond to two types of causality. When-
ever the spin-o® is motivated by a worker learning that he would be a good
entrepreneur (type I spin-o®), the spin-o® implies a depletion e®ect (good
talent leaves the parent), which increases the probability of parental death.
Whenever a worker learns that his employer is unlikely to survive for very
long, the opportunity cost of starting a new ¯rm becomes lower and all types
of worker leave the ¯rm to start a new one (type II spin-o®).
We tested our theory on a unique dataset from the US automobile in-
dustry. Our empirical ¯ndings provide support for the various predictions
derived from our theoretical model. While we chose the automobile industry
as an application, we would expect our results to be more widely applicable.
Our paper sheds new light on policy discussions regarding spin-o®s. We
are among the ¯rst ones to investigate the e®ect of spin-o®s on the survival of
their parents (see also Campbell et al, 2009). Our results re¯ne the existing
literature regarding \covenant not to compete" type laws by considering spin-
o®s motivated by passive learning. We show that, while such spin-o®s are
likely to decrease the value and survival of parent ¯rms, their outcome is
nevertheless socially bene¯cial, as they optimally reallocate human capital.
In other words, we argue that the view of spin-o®s as pure business stealing
is incomplete.
10. Results from all of these alternative regressions are available from the authors upon
request.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We need to check the following equilibrium
conditions:
² LL ¯rms prefer to exit, whereas all other types prefer to remain active.
² Insider agents, regardless of type, prefer to start a new ¯rm rather
than exiting the industry. By \insider" we mean that the agent has
already paid the initial learning cost, so that creating a new ¯rm costs
Á, whereas ¯rst-time entrants need to pay an entry cost Ã + Á.
² H workers prefer to attempt a spin-o®, whereas L workers prefer to
remain in employment.11
Essentially, these conditions require that Ã be very high (e.g., there is a
large learning cost of getting into the industry), ¼LL is very low whereas the
remaining ¼z are high; and ! has an intermediate value.
We proceed as follows. First, we write out the value functions for man-
agers, entrepreneurs and workers. Then we impose the required equilibrium
inequalities on these value functions. Finally, we show there exists an open
set of parameter values satisfying the equilibrium conditions.
Value functions. Let Vz be the value of owning a ¯rm of type z (z =
HH;HL;LH;LL). Let Vi be the value of a type i insider agent (i = H;L)
who does not currently hold a secure job in the industry. Let VE be the value
of a potential entrant. Finally, let Wi be the value of a currently employed
worker of type i (i = H;L).
At a stationary equilibrium, because there is exit, there must also be
entry. Since there is an in¯nite measure of potential entrants, each entrant
must be indi®erent between entering and not entering, the latter yielding the
outside option value ». This implies that
» = ®VH + (1 ¡ ®)VL ¡ Ã (1)
11. Throughout, we assume that the worker's wage is su±ciently high that being a
worker (including the option of becoming an entrepreneur) is better than the outside
option.
23and VE = ». As to the value of insider agents, we have
VH = ½
¡
®VHH + (1 ¡ ®)VHL
¢
+ (1 ¡ ½)» ¡ Á
VL = ½
¡
®VLH + (1 ¡ ®)VLL
¢
+ (1 ¡ ½)» ¡ Á
(2)
The value Vz of owning a ¯rm of type z is given by




(1 ¡ ½ + ½®)VHH + ½(1 ¡ ®)VHL
¢
+ (1 ¡ °)VH
´
VHL = ¼HL + ±
¡
° VHL + (1 ¡ °)VH
¢




(1 ¡ ½ + ½®)VLH + ½(1 ¡ ®)VLL
¢
+ (1 ¡ °)VL
´
VLL = ¼LL + ± VL
(3)
where ± is the discount factor. The linear system formed by (2) and (3)
yields unique values fVzg (z = H;L;HH;HL;LH;LL) as functions of model
parameters ®;½;°;±;Á;Ã;» and ¼z. (Recall that ¼z = pyz ¡ !.) Finally,
substituting for VH and VL in (1), and simplifying, we get
®
2 VHH + ®(1 ¡ ®)VHL + (1 ¡ ®)®VLH + (1 ¡ ®)




Transition equations. Let ¹z be the measure of ¯rms of type z and º
the measure of new entrants. In a stationary equilibrium, we have:
¹HH = ¹HH
¡
° (1 ¡ ½) + 2½®
¢
+ ¹HL (1 ¡ °)½® + ¹LH ½® + º ®
2
¹HL = 2¹HH ½(1 ¡ ®) + ¹HL
¡
° + (1 ¡ °)½(1 ¡ ®)
¢
+
+ ¹LH ½(1 ¡ ®) + º ®(1 ¡ ®)
¹LH = ¹HL (1 ¡ °)½® + ¹LH
¡
½® + ° (1 ¡ ½)
¢
+
+ 2¹LL ½® + º ®(1 ¡ ®)
¹LL = ¹HL(1 ¡ °)½(1 ¡ ®) + ¹LH ½(1 ¡ ®)+
+ 2¹LL ½(1 ¡ ®) + º (1 ¡ ®)
2
(5)
This linear system induces a unique solution f¹zg as a function of º and
parameters ®;½;°;±.
Equilibrium price and measure of entrants. Substituting the so-
lution to (2){(3) into (4) and simplifying, we get
c1 p ¡ c2 = 0 (6)
24where c1 is a function of ®;½;°;± as well as the values of yz; and c2 is a
function of ®;½;°;± as well as the values of !;Ã;Á and ». Moreover c1 > 0
and c2 > 0.
Substituting the solution of (5) for ¹z in the industry output equation,
Y =
P
¹z yz we get
Y = c3 º (7)
where c3 is a function of ®;½;°;± and the values of yz; and moreover c3 > 0.
From (7), we see that, as º ranges from zero to 1, so does Y . Therefore,
as Y varies from zero to 1, p varies from 1 to zero. From (6), it follows
that there exist unique º and p satisfying (6){(7).
We next look at the equilibrium constraints regarding each agent's deci-
sion.
Firm's exit decision. Consider the decision of an LL ¯rm. By deciding
to remain active, rather than exit, such ¯rm would expect a value VLL =











The expressions become more complicated as we consider ¯rms with an H
worker. For LH, we can solve (3) to get
VLH =
³
1 ¡ ± °
¡
1 ¡ ½(1 ¡ ®)
¢´¡1
µ
¼LH + ± ½(1 ¡ ®)¼LL +
³
±




We require that VLH ¸ VL, which is equivalent to
VL ·
¼LH + ± ½(1 ¡ ®)¼LL
1 ¡ ±
¡
° + (2 ¡ 3°)½(1 ¡ ®)
¢ (10)
25As for ¯rm HH, we can solve (3) to get
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Compare the right-hand side of this inequality to that of (9): the numerator
is higher, whereas the denominator is lower. It follows that (11) is implied
by (9).
Worker's spin-o® decision. Consider now an worker's decision when
employed by a continuing ¯rm. Let Wi be the value of such worker, where
i = H;L is his type. If the worker decides to attempt a spin-o®, then
Wi = Vi. If instead the worker decides to remain in employment, then
Wi = ! + ±
¡




! + ± (1 ¡ °)Vi
1 ¡ ± °
We therefore impose the twin conditions
VH ¸
! + ± (1 ¡ °)VH
1 ¡ ± °
VL ·
! + ± (1 ¡ °)VL






Insider's decision. An insider must decide whether to attempt creating
a ¯rm or rather taking the outside option ». Our equilibrium assumption is
that all insiders attempt to create a ¯rm. This implies
VL ¸ » (13)
26Since VH > VL, the condition VH ¸ » is implied by the condition VL ¸ ».
Parameter values satisfying equilibrium conditions. The claim
is that there exists an open set of parameter values such that the equilib-
rium outline above exists. The key equilibrium conditions are: (8), (9), (10),
(12), (13). Suppose that ® = 1
2; ° = ± = ½ = :9; » = 0;Á = 1;Ã = 10;
¼LL = 0 ¡ !;¼LH = 5 ¡ !;¼HL = 6 ¡ !;¼HH = 7 ¡ !; and ! = 1. Then
all of the ¯ve inequalities are satis¯ed strictly. This shows there is an open
set of parameter values satisfying the equilibrium conditions. Notice that
we are arbitrating the revenue portion of ¼z, which is endogenous. In fact,
¼z = pyz ¡ !, where p is endogenous. However, by appropriately changing
the demand curve, we can obtain any value of equilibrium price. So, starting
with primite values of yz, we can change the demand curve and obtain val-
ues of pyz that maintain the initial proportions. So we can simply assume
yLL = 0;yLH = 5;yLH = 6;yLH = 7; and the above values are then derive
from primitive parameter values. Alternatively, for a given demand curve,
we can change the values of yz proportionately with respect to the values
above.
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